Redefining the Experimental or Investigational Exclusion: A Guide for ERISA Health Plans by Brock, Stuart A.
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 24
Number 1 Volume 24, Numbers 1 & 2 Article 4
4-1-2001
Redefining the Experimental or Investigational
Exclusion: A Guide for ERISA Health Plans
Stuart A. Brock
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brock, Stuart A. (2001) "Redefining the Experimental or Investigational Exclusion: A Guide for ERISA Health Plans," North Carolina
Central Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/4
REDEFINING THE "EXPERIMENTAL OR
INVESTIGATIONAL" EXCLUSION: A GUIDE FOR
ERISA HEALTH PLANS
STUART A. BROCK, CCMt
INTRODUCTION
As the major provider of health insurance and health plan benefits,
employers have seen their medical costs rise at a rate of approxi-
mately 18% per year.' If this rate continues, analysts project that
health care costs will consume 100% of the gross national product by
the year 2050.2 Faced with this grim financial outlook, employers
have turned to cost containment methods to reduce their health care
costs. One such method is the inclusion within the health plan of ex-
clusionary clauses, especially those that exclude coverage for experi-
mental or investigational treatments.
Based on the current state of rapid proliferation and diversity of
medical interventions, health care consumers, health care providers,
and third-party payers find themselves in disagreement regarding the
effectiveness of certain procedures and treatment modalities in the
management of injury and disease.4 As consumers battle for access to
treatments of choice, physicians struggle with balancing research find-
ings from innovative treatments against more generally accepted stan-
dards of care and payers attempt to avoid the increased costs for
unproven therapies.' While health plans design, draft, and administer
f Stuart Brock maintains a consulting practice that caters to the unique needs of health
care administrators. His work includes the development of plan designs, policies and proce-
dures; staff training modules; design and implementation of managed care programs: and, claims
and utilization management. Stuart received his undergraduate degree in biology from Wake
Forest University and continued his studies in the clinical sciences at the Bowman Gray School
of Medicine of Wake Forest University. He also holds the designation of Certified Case Man-
ager from the Commission for Certification of Case Managers.
Stuart is a graduate of North Carolina Central University School of Law. He is an associate
with the law firm of Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, PLLC in Winston-Salem, North Caro-
lina. His practice areas are insurance, governmental and tort litigation.
1. Robert Kuttner, Sick Joke: The Failings of "Managed" Care; Health Insurance, New
Republic, Dec. 2, 1991, at 20.
2. Id.
3. Jody C. Collins, Experimental Medical Treatments: Who Should Decide Coverage?, 20
Seattle U. L. Rev. 451, 474 (1997).
4. Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1719
(1987).
5. Eddy, Comparing Benefits and Harms: The Balance Sheet, 263 JAMA 2493 (1990).
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health benefits, health plan providers are increasingly being called
upon to defend their benefit contracts in the face of rapid technologi-
cal advances, increased consumer demand for these advances, and in-
terventions by the judiciary and legislature. As health plans seek to
limit costs, they find themselves in a heated controversy with health
care providers and plan participants.
There are many factors that have led to this controversy. First, plan
participants expect that their health plans will pay for potentially life-
saving treatments, even if these treatments are still under investiga-
tion in a research program. When the health plan denies coverage
asserting the experimental or investigational exclusion, the plan par-
ticipant often chooses litigation to obtain the benefits.6 Second,
health care providers and researchers are desperate to seek third-
party reimbursement to support their medical research as a result of
decreasing research funds from other sources.7 Third, state legisla-
tures often resort to mandating benefits coverage by third-party pay-
ers in order to pay for the research.8 Finally, state and federal courts
have been inconsistent in their interpretations of exclusionary clauses
and have increased confusion regarding what is covered.9
To escape the judicial uncertainty and state mandated coverage,
employers have turned to ERISA for protection. This protection is
found in the statute's preemption clause that states that ERISA's pro-
visions "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ER-
ISA. ° While ERISA exempts state insurance regulations from this
preemption, it also provides that ERISA plans shall not be deemed to
be an insurance company or other insurer. In effect, this seemingly
contradictory language of the statute prevents ERISA plans from be-
ing regulated as insurance companies by the states.1' The main goal
of preemption is to ensure that ERISA plans are governed by a uni-
form set of federal regulations, rather than the various state regula-
tions governing insurance companies. 12
However, employers have not escaped the uncertainty created by
the variable interpretations of the federal judiciary. The dilemma fac-
ing employers providing ERISA health plans is explained through an
analysis of the coverage disputes involving a highly controversial
6. Mary Ader, Access to Investigational Treatments, 6 Health Matrix 187 (1996).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985).
11. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 571 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
12. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987).
2001]
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treatment for breast cancer, high dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplant ("HDC/ABMT"), which was intensely liti-
gated throughout the late 1980's and into the 1990's. This comment
will use this case history to illustrate methods that may be used by the
ERISA health plan to minimize its exposure to the costs of experi-
mental or investigational treatments. Part I will describe exclusionary
clauses and the rationale for their inclusion in health plans. Part II
will define clinical research methodology and include a description of
the various agencies and organizations that may be involved. Part III
will describe the evolution of the judicial interpretations in the HDC/
AMBT cases, emphasizing the plan language upon which the courts
based their decisions. Part IV will demonstrate the typical plan exclu-
sion clause and offer recommendations to improve it in view of the
HDC/ABMT cases.
PART I. EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES FOR EXPERIMENTAL OR
INVESTIGATIONAL TREATMENTS
Health plans pay for medical treatments that have been scientifi-
cally proven as safe, effective, and necessary.' 3 However, these plans
refuse to pay for procedures and treatments that have no definite sci-
entific value.'4 As a result, health plans protect their participants
from unsafe, ineffective, and wasteful treatments while maintaining
affordable premiums for all plan participants. 5 With the ever increas-
ing costs of health care, these efforts of health plans are based upon
sound policy. 6
Health care costs have risen dramatically in the last decade due in
large part to the rapid evolution of new medical technologies. 7 As a
direct result, these technologies are a legitimate target for those health
plans attempting to curb costs. Courts have recognized that it is both
necessary and reasonable for health plans to exclude coverage for "ex-
perimental or investigational" treatments. One court noted that "sub-
scriber premiums should not have to pay for procedures which are
purely experimental or investigative or subsidize every scientist stir-
ring a magic potion in some laboratory at the top of a mountain with
13. John L. Cova, A Swift Response to a "Modest" Proposal, 84 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 744
(1992).
14. James Cline & Keith Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment of
Health Care Cost, 21 Tort & Ins. L.J. 120, 131 (1985).
15. Barbara A. Fisfis, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical Treatment Necessa-
rily Incurred Should Be Excluded from Coverage Under a Health Insurance Policy Provision
Which Excludes from Coverage "Experimental" Medical Treatment?, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 777, 779-81
(1993).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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lightning flashing about."18 In any rational health care system, there
are limitations on coverage and affordability. 9 Despite the rational
basis for these exclusions, health plans are in the unenviable position
of defining and enforcing these limits. These plans must respond to
the demands for new technologies, ensure the safety and efficacy of
the treatments, and contain the costs of covered health care.2 0 As a
result, health plans usually include clauses that exclude coverage for
"experimental or investigational" treatments. Because ERISA allows
employers the freedom of benefit design, almost all ERISA health
plans will contain exclusions for "experimental or investigational"
treatments.21
The issue then becomes how to define "experimental or investiga-
tional." One definition provides that "experimental" procedures are
those that are untested or unproved or not related to the patient's
therapy but rather performed solely for the purpose of obtaining sci-
entific data.22 Another definition states that an "experimental or in-
vestigational" service is one which:
1. Is under clinical investigation by health professionals and is not
generally recognized by the medical profession as tested and accepted
medical practice[;]
2. Requires approval by the Federal Drug Administration or other
governmental agency, and such approval has not been granted at the
time the service or supply is ordered[; or,]
3. Has been classified by the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield As-
sociation as experimental or investigational.23
This definition still leaves a void for it fails to define both "generally
recognized" and "accepted medical practice." This problem of defin-
ing these terms is not easily solved as evidenced by the HDC/ABMT
cases.
PART II. MEDICAL RESEARCH: How DOES IT WORK?
Approval of drugs by the Food and Drug Administration provides
health plans with some guidance to determine when a drug or medical
device is no longer experimental, but there are no national guidelines
or approval processes for procedures and other types of treatments.24
18. Rollo v. Blue Cross/ Blue Shield, No. CIV.A.90-597, 1990 WL 312647, at *7 (D.N.J.
Mar. 22, 1990).
19. Ader, supra note 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Jennifer Belk, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance Con-
tracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 809, 809 (1991).
23. Boland v. King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 641 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
24. Letter from Sarah F. Jaggar, Director, Health Financing and Public Health Issues,
United States General Accounting office, to the Honorable Ron Wyden, United States Senate
2001]
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There is no equivalent governmental body that systematically screens
medical procedures, including new uses for FDA approved drugs, for
safety and efficacy.2'As a result, .these procedures and other treat-
ments can be widely used while still being labeled experimental by
health plans.26
A. Approval of Medical Treatments or Procedures
The American Medical Association has established the Diagnostic
and Therapeutic Technology Assessment ("DATTA") program27
while the American College of Physicians ("ACP") similarly reviews
procedures through its Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project
("CEAP"). 8
For example, the DATTA program consists of a five point rating
scale where procedures or treatment modalities are ranked between
"promising" and "doubtful. '29 Those procedures deemed "investiga-
tional" appear in the middle of this scale.3°
The DATTA program defines an experimental procedure as fol-
lows: "There is no consensus on the (a) safety or (b) effectiveness of
this technology to date, there is insufficient evidence to determine its
appropriateness, or it warrants further study; use of this technology
for the given indication in the specified patient population should be
confined largely to research protocols."'31
B. Clinical Trials
Clinical trials are conducted to test the effectiveness of new treat-
ments involving new drugs or combinations of existing drugs. Such
trials are considered the "gold standard" for judging whether or not
these new therapies are better than existing ones. 32 The trials are di-
vided into four phases in which each phase is designed to obtain spe-
cific types of information.
(Apr. 24, 1996), reprinted in General Accounting Office, Health Insurance: Coverage of Autolo-
gous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer 1, 12-15 (1996).
25. Cowan, Innovative Therapy Versus Experimentation, 21 Tort & Ins. L.J. 619, 626 (1986).
26. Id.
27. American Medical Association, Technology Assessment in Medicine (visited October 27,
1999) <http://www.ama-assn.org>.
28. White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
29. American Medical Association, Technology Assessment in Medicine (visited Oct. 27,
1999) <http://www.ama-assn.org>.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health, Understanding Trials -
An Introduction to Clinical Trials, (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/under-
standingfbasics/index.html>.
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In Phase I of clinical trials for cancer treatments, a new treatment is
given to a small number of patients, usually 20-80."3 The purpose of a
Phase I study is to find the best way to administer a new treatment
and how much of it can be given safely.34 Physicians watch patients
carefully for any harmful side effects. The research treatment has
been well tested in laboratory and animal studies, but the side effects
in patients are not completely predictable.35 Phase I studies may in-
volve significant risks such that Phase I cancer trials are offered only
to patients whose cancer has spread and who would not be helped by
other known treatments.36
Phase II studies determine the effect of a research treatment on
various types of diseases, such as cancer.37 Usually groups of 30 to 40
patients with one type of cancer or a particular severity of disease
receive Phase II treatment.38 For example, patients with breast cancer
that has become resistant to standard therapy may be treated with
Phase II treatment. Patients are closely observed for anticancer activ-
ity from the beginning of the trial. If their cancer sites shrink appreci-
ably, the patients are said to have "responded" to the treatment. If at
least one-fifth of the patients in the Phase II trial respond to treat-
ment, the treatment is judged active against that tumor type. 39 In ad-
dition to monitoring patients for response, physicians carefully record
and access any side effects.4° Since larger numbers of patients receive
the treatment in Phase II trials than in Phase I trials, there is a greater
chance to observe less common side effects.4 '
Phase III trials require entry of large numbers of patients; some tri-
als enroll thousands of patients. One of the groups may receive the
standard, or most accepted treatment, so that new treatments canbe
directly compared to it.42 The group that receives the standard treat-
ment is called the "control" group. For example, the control group
may receive the standard chemotherapy for breast cancer, while an-
other patient group will receive the new chemotherapeutic agent or
combination of existing agents in order to determine if this new drug
or combination of drugs improves survival.43 All patients in Phase III
33. .Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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trials are closely monitored for side effects, and treatment will be dis-
continued if the side effects are too severe.'
After successfully completing Phase III of the clinical trials, the data
is reviewed and if appropriate, the drug is approved for use.4 5 During
Phase IV, the newly approved drug is evaluated through post-market-
ing surveillance to ensure that it continues to be safe and to monitor
side effects that may not have been evident during the clinical trials.46
If problems become apparent, the drug is recalled.
PART III. HIGH DOSE CHEMOTHERAPY AND AuTOLOGOuS BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANT IN PATIENTS WITH METASTATIC
BREAST CANCER: A CASE STUDY
The dilemma began in the Eighties when a new procedure was be-
ing investigated for use in the treatment of patients with metastatic
breast cancer. This treatment was called high dose chemotherapy with
autologous bone marrow transplant, or HDC/ABMT. The proposal
was to increase the dosage of the regular chemotherapeutic regimen
beyond levels that had failed to arrest the previous development of
the breast cancer. These levels destroyed the bone marrow within the
body and thus, the patients required bone marrow transplants to re-
vive this critical body system. The effectiveness of this procedure was
widely debated as discussed below. It was this debate and the intense
litigation in the matter that increased the division between providers
and third-party payers, while providing many judicial interventions in
the exclusion of experimental or investigational procedures.
In the paragraphs that follow, some of the important judicial deci-
sions are discussed in an effort to illustrate some of the many ways in
which a health plan can attempt to protect the plan assets and thus,
the plan participants from the burden of cost-shifting associated with
medical research. This case history focuses on the language of the
health plan and the subsequent court's interpretation of that language.
One of the first cases to seek a court's intervention to force pay-
ment for HDC/ABMT was Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc.4 7
Thomas sued when the ERISA plan, Gulf Health, denied coverage for
HDC/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer. Gulf Health based its
denial upon language in the plan document that stated:
No benefits shall be provided under [sections describing the covered
services of this plan] with respect to the following, whether or not rec-
ommended or prescribed by a physician.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
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10. Any treatment or procedure, medical or surgical, or any facilities,
drugs, drug usage, equipment, or supplies which are Experimental or
Investigative. 8
The plan document also provided that "[t]o be Medically Necessary,
the services and supplies furnished must (as determined by the Ad-
ministrator) . . . not be Experimental or Investigative. 'a9
At trial' Dr. Patrick Earl Ryce, Vice-President and Medical Direc-
tor of Blue Cross, testified that in February of 1988 the medical review
committee of Blue Cross recommended that based upon its study of
the matter, HDC/ABMT should no longer be classified as experimen-
tal or investigative in connection with certain stages of Hodgkin's dis-
ease, neuroblastoma, acute lymphocytic leukemia, and acute non-
lymphocytic leukemia." When Thomas was admitted to Vanderbilt
Medical Center it was disclosed to her that HDC/ABMT for the treat-
ment of breast cancer was still considered "investigatory."'" She
signed a consent form containing this disclosure.52 The treating physi-
cian at Vanderbilt noted in a letter to Thomas' primary physician that
he recommended that Thomas proceed with "an experimental treat-
ment" such as HDC/ABMT.53
The court noted that ERISA governed because it involved claims
for benefits under the health plan.54 The court emphasized that the
standard for review of claims denials under ERISA plans was well
settled such that the plan administrator's decision to deny benefits
must be upheld unless the decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The court stated that its role was limited to a determination of
whether the administrator's interpretation "was made rationally and
in good faith-not whether it was right."56
The court found that the plan's decision was neither arbitrary nor
capricious in light of the evidence offered regarding the experimental
nature of the treatment and the plan's express exclusion of experi-
mental procedures.5 7 Further, it held that the administrator would not
be fulfilling his fiduciary duty to expand the terms of coverage pro-
48. Id. n.2.
49. Id. (alterations in original).
50. Id. n.3.
51. Id. at 593.
52. Id.
53. Id. n.4.
54. Id. at 595.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
995 (1985) (quoting Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 825 (11" Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984)).
57. Id.
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vided by the plan.5 8 The court agreed that the decision to enforce the
terms of the plan and to deny coverage for the experimental treatment
proposed to Thomas was rational and supported by the evidence
before him.59 As a result, the decision to deny coverage was upheld.6"
A similar decision was reached in the 1989 case of Sweeney v.
Gerber Products Co. Med. Benefits Plan.6t Sweeney's physician pro-
posed HDC/ABMT as a treatment for her breast cancer. In its find-
ings of fact, the court noted that Sweeney's claim was denied based
upon the plan provision:
The Medical Expense Benefit Does Not Cover:
4. Unnecessary service and supplies, including tests and check-up ex-
aminations, that are not needed for medical care of a diagnosed sick-
ness or injury. To be "needed," a service or supply must be (a)
ordered by a doctor, (b) commonly and customarily recognized
throughout the doctor's profession as appropriate in the treatment or
diagnosis of the sickness or injury, (c) neither educational or experi-
mental in nature, (investigational procedures are considered experi-
mental), and (d) neither furnished mainly for the purpose of medical
nor other research ..... 6
Prudential, as administrator and named fiduciary, denied the claim on
the grounds that the proposed treatment was not commonly and cus-
tomarily recognized throughout the doctor's profession as appropriate
and that the treatment was considered educational, experimental, or
investigational in nature.63 In its denial, Prudential examined Swee-
ney's medical history, the specific treatment protocol proposed for
her, the status of its viability in the current medical literature, and the
opinions of three outside consultants/oncologists.64
As a finding of fact, the court noted that HDC/ABMT for breast
cancer was in the early stages of development and was at most under-
going efficacy testing in Phase II clinical trials.65 The court found that
the current medical literature supported the conclusion that the treat-
ment was "investigational" and "experimental" and had not been
"commonly and customarily" recognized throughout the medical pro-
fession as appropriate in the treatment of metastatic breast cancer.66
It emphasized that the physician's own consent forms were replete
58. Id. at 596.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Sweeney v. Gerber Prod. Co. Med. Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989).
62. Id. at 595.
63. Id. at 596.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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with such terms as "study," "research," "investigation," and
"experiment. ' 67
The court concluded that the Gerber Products Co. Medical Benefits
Plan was an employee welfare benefit plan as defined by ERISA.68 It
noted that the Administrative Services Agreement between the plan
and Prudential provided that Gerber Products Company retained "all
final authority and responsibility for the Plan and its operation" and
that Prudential was authorized to act on its behalf.69 Further, this
agreement specified that Gerber Products Company and Prudential
mutually agreed that for purposes of ERISA, "Prudential shall be the
'appropriate named fiduciary' of the Plan for the purpose of such re-
view [of claims] and decision thereon" and "Prudential's decision on
any claim shall be final." 0 Thus, the court concluded that the decision
to deny benefits in the case would be upheld unless it was deemed
arbitrary and capricious.7v
The court held that the decision to deny benefits in this case was
based upon a reasonable interpretation of the plan provisions. 72 It
also held that this decision was made in good faith following a detailed
investigation of the factual background of the claim and the proposed
treatment.7 3 The court concluded that the decision to deny benefits
for HDC/ABMT was not arbitrary and capricious and upheld that
decision.74
The atmosphere began to change in 1991 with the case of Bucci v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc.75 Bucci's physicians rec-
ommended that she be given HDC/ABMT because all other forms of
treatment had failed. Blue Cross denied the treatment on the policy
provision that "[defendant] will not pay for services . . . which are
experimental or investigational in nature; meaning any treatment,
procedure... drugs, drug usage.., not recognized as accepted medi-
cal practice or not recognized by us .... 76 Because of Bucci's ad-
vanced medical condition, the matter was expedited before further
deterioration occurred.77
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (the hallmark case
for ERISA plans in which the Supreme Court established the standard of review for claims
denials)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 597.
75. Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991).
76. Id. at 729 (alteration in original).
77. Id.
2001]
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Bucci presented evidence that tended to show that HDC/ABMT
was more effective than lower dose chemotherapy.7" The evidence
varied regarding its effectiveness, but the court noted that conclusive
improvement was not controlling, since the question was one of the
acceptance of the treatment modality.79 Bucci's experts stated that
while the advantages of HDC/ABMT were not established by an
overwhelming number of cases in which the treatment was tested,
there was sufficient experience to support their opinion of the medical
efficacy of the treatment.8 0
Blue Cross argued that experience with HDC/ABMT was too lim-
ited to permit a meaningful assessment of its efficacy.8" It noted the
care it took to evaluate procedures for payment by highly qualified
committees, whose judgments were accepted for payment purposes. 82
In fact, Blue Cross had applied its five-factor Technical Evaluation
Criteria ("TEC") in this case. The criteria were (1) government regu-
latory approval; (2) evidence which permits conclusions as to the ef-
fect on patient health; (3) demonstrated improvement of the patient's
health; (4) demonstration of medical benefit at least equal to that of-
fered by established alternative treatment; and, (5) improvement
other than in investigational settings.83 Blue Cross had used these cri-
teria to determine that HDC/ABMT was an accepted treatment mo-
dality for several other forms of cancer.84
Reviewing the case under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
court held that Blue Cross' decision was arbitrary and capricious and
that the claim should be paid.85 The court stated that Blue Cross was
made aware that thirty-eight health insurers had committed to the
University of Nebraska, while thirty-two insurers had committed to
Duke University to provide coverage for HDC/ABMT. 6 The court
found that while the insuring language and the treatment regimens
were not precisely the same as in this case, the issue was sufficiently
likely to have been comparable to oblige Blue Cross to inquire of
these insurers regarding their determination to provide coverage. 7
The court stated that Blue Cross' failure to inquire suggests an arbi-
trary and capricious denial which is made without all reasonably rele-
78. Id. at 730.
79. Id. at 731.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
11
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vant inquiries.88 It stated further that the body of medical acceptance
that prompted these insurers to cover the treatment, regardless of the
criteria applied, was deemed likely to have been relevant to whether
there was substantiation for Bucci's treatment being considered ex-
perimental or not experimental.89
The court then stated that Blue Cross' reliance on TEC was not
valid.9" First, government approval was not applicable except as to
the drugs, and these drugs had been approved.9 Second, the court
rejected factors two, three, and four stating that they were purely sub-
jective and reflected the essence of Blue Cross' position, that in the
absence of a sufficient body of evidence demonstrating the effective-
ness of the procedure in providing substantial medical benefit to pa-
tients, it was proper to find the procedure not recognized as accepted
medical practice. 92 The court stated that the policy set no standard by
which the acceptance was to be measured and thus was invalid.93 It
stated that if the standard used was to be regarded as anything other
than arbitrary and capricious, then finding that a procedure failed to
constitute accepted medical practice could only exist where there was
no reasonably substantial, qualified, responsible, relevant segment of
the medical community that accepts it as properly within the range of
appropriate medical treatment as judged by the standards of the medi-
cal community.94
The court stated that under Blue Cross' theory any number its ex-
perts selected, without any obligation to justify the minimum number
required, could result in denial of benefits with impunity.95 It empha-
sized that Blue Cross was attempting to deny the procedure as unac-
ceptable when measured against a standard which was neither defined
in the plan nor justified under ERISA.96 The court stated that this
standard was a "floating standard" that could rise and fall in any fact
situation. 97 The court held that the standard was arbitrary and capri-
cious, and stated that this holding was further substantiated by the fact
that the denial avoided a direct expense to Blue Cross rather than an
allocation of committed funds and by the "firm, reasonable and logical
88. Id. at 732.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 733.
96. Id.
97. Id.
2001]
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testimony of [Bucci's] two well-qualified oncologists. '"98 As a result,
the court ordered that Blue Cross pay for the procedure.
Later that same year, the court in White v. Caterpillar, Inc.99
reached a similar result. White sued after the self-funded plan de-
nied coverage for ABMT. White was diagnosed with breast cancer.
All other forms of treatment failed to arrest the disease. White's phy-
sician stated in his affidavit that White had no chance of survival with-
out HDC/ABMT and that with conventional treatment the disease
would continue to progress to her death."' When White's health plan
denied coverage, she filed suit.
White's employer-sponsored health plan qualified as an employee
welfare benefit plan under ERISA.'0 ' The Plan provided:
If an Employee or Dependent undergoes a procedure that is not listed
in the schedule [of surgical operations] above, the Insurance Carrier
or Company shall have the sole and exclusive right to determine
whether or not such procedure is a generally accepted surgical opera-
tion. The Company or Insurance Carrier will use the reports of the
Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project of the American College of Phy-
sicians and the Diagnostic and Therapeutic Assessment from the
Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association as
a guide to determine whether a surgical procedure is a generally ac-
cepted surgical operation. 10 2
The Plan contended that based upon this language the denial was
proper because the treatment was "investigational" and not a gener-
ally accepted surgical operation covered under the Plan.0 3 Since the
Plan gave discretion to the administrator to make eligibility determi-
nations, the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard dic-
tated by Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 4
Both parties agreed that the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project
("CEAP") did not address the efficacy of HDC/ABMT in the treat-
ment of breast cancer. 105 Thus, the court turned to the opinion of
DATTA on the issue. A 1985 DATfA report concluded that ABMT
was a safe and effective means of treating the side effects of HDC, but
that it was "still investigational" in the treatment of solid tumors, such
as breast cancer.106 In a 1990 DATTA report that addressed cancer in
general rather than solid tumors specifically, the panelists found that
98. Id.
99. White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
100. Id. at 1419.
101. Id. at 1419-20.
102. Id. at 1420.
103. Id. citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1421.
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ABMT was appropriate for the management of post-treatment mar-
row complications in patients undergoing treatment for cancer.107
The majority of panelists rated the safety and effectiveness of ABMT
as established or promising 0 8
The plan argued that this second report did not specifically revise
the earlier report with respect to the efficacy of HDC/ABMT on solid
tumors. It contended that those earlier findings were still accurate
because the second report focused on the efficacy of ABMT as a sup-
portive treatment for the side effects of HDC and did not specifically
revise the findings of the 1985 report. 0 9
White argued that the 1985 report was dated, and her expert witness
testified at the hearing that HDC/ABMT was widely recognized and
used for the treatment of breast cancer in certain patient populations,
including White." 0 Her expert also testified that a 1991 study pub-
lished in the Journal of Clinical Oncology reported that eighty percent
of the clinical oncologists polled believed that HDC/ABMT was a rea-
sonable therapy.'11 He added that a physician would be medically
negligent not to offer the treatment to an appropriate patient." 2
The court emphasized that in an environment of rapidly changing
medical expertise, the plan steadfastly relied on the results of a study
that was over five years old.1 13 It noted that prior to the hearing,
White provided the plan with copies of four recent articles addressing
HDC/ABMT." 4 According to the testimony of the medical director
for the plan, no one there ever read the articles."a 5 Instead, the plan
relied upon the two sources enumerated in the plan document rather
than the other sources provided by White." 6
The court disagreed with the plan's reliance stating that the plan's
recognition of the two sources was not exhaustive. 1 7 It added that
the plan stated that these sources would be used as a "guide" to deter-
mine whether a surgical procedure was generally accepted.'" 8 The
court stated that nowhere did the plan state that it may use "only" the
reports listed in making its coverage decisions. 19 It continued that
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. n.4.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1420.
114. Id. at 1422.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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this language clearly did not instruct the plan to abdicate all responsi-
bility in the decision process to these reports, especially where one
report never addressed the issue while the other report was over five
years old. 12
0
The court was especially troubled that the plan continued to refuse
coverage even after receiving the affidavit of Dr. Elizabeth Brown,
the Director of the agency that administered the DATTA studies.12 1
In her affidavit, Dr. Brown stated her agency did not "list [ABMT] in
conjunction with [HDC] for the treatment of breast cancer as 'investi-
gational.' ,,122 She also stated that DATTA had not investigated nor
published any materials on the efficacy of ABMT in conjunction with
HDC for the treatment of breast cancer specifically. 2 3 As a result,
the court held that the plan's decision to deny coverage was arbitrary
and capricious and enjoined the plan from denying coverage to White
for HDC/ABMT. 124
In 1992, this trend of coverage for HDC/ABMT was challenged in
the case of Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co.125 Holder's physicians rec-
ommended HDC/ABMT for treatment of her advanced breast cancer.
She signed a consent form for treatment and later died of complica-
tions. "'26 When Prudential denied coverage for high dose chemother-
apy with ABMT, Holder's estate filed the action.
The consent form signed by Holder stated:
This is an experimental study which uses high doses of [chemothera-
peutic agents] in the treatment, combined with bone marrow trans-
plantation. The use of higher-than-normal doses of chemotherapy
carries with it a greater risk of complications to both the blood-form-
ing cells of the body (the marrow) and other organs. Therefore, the
purposes of this study are: 1) to find if such a combination is associ-
ated with acceptable toxicity to organs other than the bone marrow
when used with the infusion of autologous marrow; and 2) to deter-
mine if, at these high doses, there is a significant responses rate.127
Based upon the terms "experimental" and "study," the plan denied
coverage for the procedure based upon the policy's exclusion for ex-
perimental treatment. 28 Specifically, the policy for the plan provided
that it did not cover:
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1423.
124. Id.
125. Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 89 (51h Cir. 1992).
126. Id. at 90.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id.
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Non-essentials, check-ups-Anything not ordered by a doctor or not
reasonably necessary for medical care of sickness or injury. To be
"reasonably necessary," a service or supply must be ordered by a doc-
tor and be commonly and customarily recognized throughout the doc-
tor's profession as appropriate in the treatment of the diagnosed
sickness or injury. It must neither be educational or experimental in
nature, nor provided [sic]. 12 9
The opinions of the experts were contradictory regarding the exper-
imental nature of this treatment. 130 Clinical studies showed that the
treatment was still being investigated at the time of Holder's treat-
ment.13 1 Most importantly, the court found the testimony of Dr.
Fehir, the plan's expert witness, to be "most compelling" and "most
credible." 13 2 Based upon this testimony and the consent form describ-
ing the treatment as an "experimental study," the court upheld the
plan's denial of coverage for the procedure. 33
Today, the coverage issues surrounding this procedure are fairly
well resolved, but there are still mixed feelings. Most plans have be-
gun to accept liability for the procedure in view of the mixed legal
decisions and the lack of "protective" language which can be con-
structed in the plan. 134 The effectiveness of the procedure continues
to be questioned. A review in 1995 of the medical literature con-
ducted by ECRI, a non-profit technology assessment and health ser-
vice firm, indicates that high dose chemotherapy and ABMT are no
more effective against breast cancer than conventional forms of chem-
otherapy. 135 The review also concluded that women with stage IV
breast cancer who undergo this costly and difficult experimental pro-
cedure have poor outcomes and die sooner than those who receive
standard regimens of chemotherapy.' 36 ECRI cautioned that its find-
ings were based solely upon a snapshot of the then current state of
medical technology. 137
129. Id. n.3.
130. Id. at 90.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 90-91.
133. Id. at 91.
134. William Giese, M.D., Adjudication of Third Party Payment for High Dose Chemother-
apy & Bone Marrow Rescue in the Treatment of Breast Cancer. 1 DePaul J. Health Care L. 205
(1996).
135. Joan Stephenson, Medical Technology Watchdog Plays Unique Role in Quality Assess-
ment: ECRI, 274 JAMA 999, 999 (1995).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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PART IV. REDEFINING THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE IN THE ERISA
HEALTH PLAN
What does this mean? How can an ERISA health plan protect it-
self from the financial, ethical, and emotional struggles that surround
"experimental or investigational" treatments such as HDC/ABMT?
There are no guarantees, quick fixes, or perfect solutions. This section
makes recommendations that are meant to assist ERISA health plan
sponsors and plan administrators with the process of research and
with the formulation of plan language that may help protect the plan's
assets and thus, the benefits to all plan participants.
A. Generally
First, the best language for the plan will be that which is as specific
as possible and excludes any procedures the plan sponsor or plan ad-
ministrator believes contains "gray" areas.138 The plan should include
a laundry list of specific exclusions for all services that are deemed to
be unsafe, unnecessary, or uninsurable.' 39 However, this list is only a
partial solution because of the practical problem of including all mate-
rially relevant coverage terms in each summary of the policy. 4 ° In
addition, it may be possible to draft a list that clearly identifies unwar-
ranted procedures or specific applications of useful procedures in un-
warranted cases, but such a list cannot be drafted with sufficient detail
to cover all the permutations that could possibly occur.14 1
Second, this language should be stated in both the plan document
and the summary plan description ("SPD") for the ERISA plan. In
cases where the SPD incorporated by reference the language in the
plan document, courts have rejected outright such incorporation by
reference and required that the language must be in the hands of the
individual plan participants. 142
Third, the language should state specific guidelines that will be fol-
lowed. Blue Cross has been criticized by the courts for failure to in-
corporate its Technology Evaluation Criteria into its contracts.143
While it may not be feasible to specify a threshold after which a treat-
138. See Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy - A Third-Party Payer's Di-
lemma, 323 New Eng. J. Med. 1702 (1990).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Grace P. Monaco & Rebecca L. Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper-Part Two: Policy Obsta-
cles in Unproven Methods of Litigation, 20 Forum 400, 402 n.7 (1983).
142. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1570 n.16 (11"' Cir. 1990);
Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
143. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586. 591 (E.D. Va. 1990) (finding
Blue Cross' reliance on its Technology Evaluation Criteria unpersuasive in part because the
criteria were not a part of the Plan and because the Plan did not state that the criteria were
determinative of a treatment's experimental status); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn.,
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ment will be deemed appropriate in all circumstances, the plan can
specify the quality of evidence that will be necessary to satisfy the
standard for coverage. 14
4
Fourth, regardless of the precision in which these criteria are
drafted, they may ultimately be subjected to judicial interpretation.
Therefore, it is imperative that the plan expressly provide that the
plan administrator reserves the final right to make decisions regarding
coverage. To do so may ensure that where the courts review the deci-
sion, they must do so using the arbitrary and capricious standard
rather than the de novo standard. 45
When courts apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, great def-
erence is given to the plan administrator's decision. This deference is
based upon the rationale that the plan trustees are better positioned
to apply and to interpret their plans as well as to balance the interests
of the plan beneficiaries. 146 The plan administrator's decision will be
upheld unless it is determined to have been arbitrary and capricious,
which usually results where there is evidence the fiduciary lacked
good faith or acted in direct conflict with express language in the
plan.' 47
Without express language naming the plan administrator, the courts
will use the de novo standard. First, this removes the deference given
by the courts to the plan administrator as a fiduciary and allows the
court to determine the interpretation of the plan that most accurately
reflects the intentions of all parties to the agreement. 48 More impor-
tantly, the court is not limited to the evidence available to the plan
administrator at the time of the decision or the information required
to make a good faith decision. 149 As a result, this standard of review
allows the court much broader freedom and should be avoided.
Fifth, the plan should utilize independent sources to review its deci-
sions to determine whether the treatment should be denied as experi-
mental. While the case law under ERISA does not prohibit a decision
on appeal by those with some conflict of interest, the mere existence
of a conflict is a factor that is to be considered even under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard. 50 The courts have employed a variety
of methods to deal with this conflict. Some have decreased the defer-
Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728, 733 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding Blue Cross' denial of benefits inappropriate
because it was based upon criteria that were not defined in the Plan).
144. Newcomer, supra note 138, at 1702.
145. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
146. Id. at 102.
147. See Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc.. 681 F.2d 306. 314 (51h Cir. 1982).
148. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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ence given the fiduciary in proportion to the seriousness of the con-
flict. '5 Others have refused to forego the deference until serious
unfairness is shown.
52
Finally, the plan should specify the organizations whose medical
technology assessment decisions it will follow. 153 There are various
private and governmental agencies that provide various levels of as-
sessment and evaluation. 154 However, the plan administrator should
not rely solely on the expressly stated sources and refuse to review
additional information if provided by the participant. Such action has
been deemed to be arbitrary and capricious.155
B. Updating the Typical Plan's Definition
This section will demonstrate how these recommendations can ef-
fectively update the typical "experimental or investigational" exclu-
sion language of an ERISA health plan so that it is consistent with
those lessons learned from the HDC/ABMT cases. The typical ER-
ISA health plan will include a definition of medical necessity and/or
experimental or investigational that contains the elements:
The term Medical Necessity means services or supplies provided by a
hospital, physician, or other provider not excluded under this Plan,
which are provided to treat or diagnose a sickness or injury, and which
as determined by the Plan Administrator, are:
1. Ordered by a physician and consistent with the symptoms or diag-
nosis and treatment of the sickness or injury.
2. Not primarily for the convenience of the covered person, physician
or other provider.
3. Most appropriate standard or level of services which accord with
good medical practice and can be safely provided to the covered
person.
4. Not of an experimental or educational nature.
5. Not involving unnecessary or repeated tests
6. Commonly and customarily recognized by the medical profession
as appropriate in the treatment or diagnosis of the diagnosed
condition.
NOTE: The fact that a physician may prescribe, recommend, order or
approve a service or supply does not, of itself, determine medical
necessity. 156
151. Doe v. Group Hospitalization, 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993).
152. Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1994).
153. Monaco & Burke, supra note 141, at 409.
154. Resources Supply Technology Information, Hospitals, Aug. 5, 1989, at 42.
155. White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
156. 2 Carlton Harker, TPA Guide to the Benefit Administration of Self-Funded Health
Care Plans § A (1995).
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To update this language according to the recommendations of the pre-
ceding section, the following additions would be necessary:
57
The term Medical Necessity means services or supplies provided by a
hospital, physician, or other provider not excluded under this Plan,
which are provided to treat or diagnose a sickness or injury, and which
are determined by the Plan Administrator, [where the Plan Adminis-
trator is then expressly named] to meet the following criteria:
1. Ordered by a physician and consistent with the symptoms or di-
agnosis and treatment of the sickness or injury.
2. Not primarily for the convenience of the covered person, physi-
cian or other provider.
3. Most appropriate standard or level of services which accord with
good medical practice and can be safely provided to the covered
person.
4. Not of an experimental or educational nature. Experimental for
the purposes of medical necessity, is defined as those treatments, ser-
vices, or supplies that are:
(1) A part of a research project, protocol, or study
(2) A part of any phase of a clinical trial of the FDA, NCI, or
other body
(3) Not supported by current medical literature to be commonly
accepted as a routine treatment for the indicated diagnosis
5. Not involving unnecessary or repeated tests
6. Commonly and customarily recognized by the medical profession
as appropriate in the treatment or diagnosis of the sickness or injury
NOTE: The Plan Administrator, [again expressly named], reserves
the full and final discretion regarding determinations of coverage
under this Plan. The fact that a physician may prescribe, recom-
mend, order or approve a service or supply does not, of itself, deter-
mine medical necessity.
As further protection, the plan should then incorporate a list of
those procedures that are excluded from coverage because they are
currently questionable or involved in "heated" medical/legal debate.
The plan should also expressly state those agencies or bodies whose
technology assessment reports will be used to determine coverage as
well as those independent review organizations that will be utilized
when denials of coverage are appealed.
CONCLUSION
Managing access to new medical technologies is critical for three
reasons.158 First, it is critical to managing the delivery of quality medi-
cal care and ensuring patient safety.159 Second, it is critical to society's
157. Additions to the model language are presented in italics for emphasis.
158. Ader, supra note 6, at 188.
159. Id.
2001]
20
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2001], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/4
44 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:24
ability to deliver a quality health care benefit within the budget of
those premiums collected.16 Finally, it is critical to managing the le-
gal risks of the failure to describe the benefits accurately and to de-
liver them efficiently. 61 ERISA allows employee health plans the
freedom of benefit design and the protection from state variances in
coverage provisions. This allows employers to curb costs and to rea-
sonably predict their exposure to legal risks because of the limited
jurisdiction in which suits may be brought. However, the HDC/
ABMT cases illustrate the complexities involved when trying to curb
costs at the expense of new technology.
While the HDC/ABMT cases have been basically resolved, the un-
derlying issues are still present. The recommendations presented here
are offered to assist ERISA plans in their drafting more precise lan-
guage to address these issues. While the recommendations are not
perfect solutions, they are valuable guides to redefining "experimental
or investigational" exclusions.
Why is this so important? Panelists at a Washington, D.C. managed
care symposium voiced concerns that ERISA was outdated with the
current health care delivery system.162 One panelist stated that ER-
ISA needs to be "beefed up" in the area of disclosure so that individu-
als know the criteria used to determine whether a procedure will be
excluded as "experimental or investigatory."' 63 The panelist added
that ERISA needs a meaningful and fair process for resolving claims
and coverage issues.' 64 The recommendations made above already re-
flect these concerns and attempt to increase disclosure as well as in-
form the plan participants of the processes that will be followed in
making such determinations.
More importantly, on July 29, 1999, CNN reported that researchers
have successfully developed specialized cells from stem cells and
transplanted them into the nervous systems of rats to fight disease.
165
In a report published in Science magazine on July 30, 1999, scientists
manipulated stem cell into neural cells and injected them into rats
whose nervous systems were afflicted with a disease similar to the
human disease, Multiple Sclerosis.1 66 The cells repaired the damage
to the nervous system, but did not cure the disease. 67 With millions
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Managed Care: In Discussion of ERISA, Panelists Mull Federal Versus State Regulation,
BNA Pension & Benefits Daily News, April 7, 1999, at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Stem Cells Show Promise in Treating Neurological Diseases (visited October 26, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9907/29/stem.cell.advance/index.html>.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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of Americans suffering from nervous tissue disorders, this procedure
could bring hope to all of them. In another report by CNN, the
United States government has announced that it will begin partially
financing this research. 168 The question then becomes who will pay
for that part not financed by the government? As in the case of HDC/
ABMT, ERISA health plans will certainly be asked to pay for these
procedures. This debate is not over, and ERISA health plans must
take action now to update their plan documents.
168. U.S. Government to Fund Controversial Stem Cell Research (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9901/19/stem.cell.research/index.html>.
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